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Lazaros Exizidis, Student Member, IEEE, Jalal Kazempour, Member, IEEE, Pierre Pinson, Senior Member, IEEE,
Zacharie De Gre´ve, Member, IEEE, and Franc¸ois Valle´e, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Following a call to foster a transparent and more
competitive market, member states of the European transmission
system operator are required to publish, among other informa-
tion, aggregate wind power forecasts. The publication of the
latter information is expected to benefit market participants
by offering better knowledge of the market operation, leading
subsequently to a more competitive energy market. Driven by the
above regulation, we consider an equilibrium study to address
how public information of aggregate wind power forecasts
can potentially affect market results, social welfare as well as
the profits of participating power producers. We investigate,
therefore, a joint day-ahead energy and reserve auction, where
producers offer their conventional power strategically based on
a complementarity approach and their wind power at generation
cost based on a forecast. In parallel, an iterative game-theoretic
approach (diagonalization) is incorporated in order to investigate
the existence of an equilibrium for various values of aggregate
forecast. As anticipated, variations in public forecasts will affect
market results and, more precisely, under-forecasts can mislead
power producers to make decisions that favor social welfare,
while over-forecasts will cause the opposite effect. Furthermore,
energy and reserve market prices can also be affected by
deviations in aggregate wind forecasts altering, inevitably, the
profits of all power producers.
Index Terms—Wind power, aggregate forecasts, public data,
equilibrium, game theory.
NOTATION:
Sets:
G Set of all conventional power units.
GJ Set of conventional power units belonging to pro-
ducer J .
W Set of all wind power units.
WJ Set of wind power units belonging to producer J .
D Set of demands.
Bi Set of generation blocks of the i-th unit.
Ω Set of wind power generation scenarios.
S Set of real-time market price scenarios.
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Indices:
J Index for producers.
i Index for conventional units.
b Index for generation blocks of conventional units.
d Index for demands.
l Index for wind power units.
ω Index for wind power generation scenarios.
s Index for real-time market price scenarios.
Variables:
pGi,b Scheduled generation for the b-th block of the i-th
conventional unit [MW].
rUi Committed upward reserve from the i-th conven-
tional unit [MW].
rDi Committed downward reserve from the i-th conven-
tional unit [MW].
λDA Energy price [$/MWh].
µU Price of capacity for committed upward reserve
[$/MWh].
µD Price of capacity for committed downward reserve
[$/MWh].
αGi,b Price offer for the b-th block of the i-th unit
[$/MWh].
pDd Scheduled consumption for the d-th demand [MW].
pWl Scheduled wind power generation for the l-th wind
power unit [MW].
pW,RTl,ω Power sold/bought in the real-time market by the l-th
wind power unit under scenario ω [MW].
Parameters:
CGi,b Marginal cost of the b-th block of the i-th unit
[$/MWh].
λDd Price bid of d-th demand [$/MWh].
γ, δ Non-negative factors representing the minimum re-
serve requirements of the market as percentage of
total demand and total installed wind capacity, re-
spectively.
W l Installed wind power capacity of the l-th unit [MW].
P
G
i,b Maximum generation capacity of the b-th block of
the i-th unit [MW].
P
D
d Maximum consumption of the d-th demand [MW].
R
U
i Maximum upward reserve capacity of the i-th unit
[MW].
R
D
i Maximum downward reserve capacity of the i-th unit
[MW].
2Fl Wind power forecast of the l-th unit as private data,
provided by its owner [MW].
FMO Aggregate wind power forecast as public informa-
tion, provided by market operator [MW].
PW,Pl,ω Wind power produced by the l-th wind power unit
under scenario ω [MW].
λRTs Real-time market price under scenario s [$/MWh].
piω Probability of scenario ω.
piλs Probability of scenario s.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
EUROPEAN electricity market regulators, representativesof EU countries and stakeholders gathered in June 2015
in Florence to discuss the implementation of the so-called
“third energy package”, which aims at improving the func-
tioning of the internal energy markets [1]. Among other,
participants agreed on the importance of renewable energy
in the energy mix, stressing however the fact that renewable
power producers should follow the same rules with conven-
tional producers and compete them without any support, under
the current framework of a liberalized market [2]. Moreover,
European Union escalated the importance for increased trans-
parency in electricity market operations, which has already
improved over the past few years following Regulation (EU)
No 543/2013 on the submission and publication of data in
electricity markets [3]. The latter implies that transmission
system operators (TSOs) shall calculate and provide for their
control areas, among other information, a forecast of wind
power generation (MW) per bidding zone, per each market
time unit of the following day to the European Network
of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E). Following
this directive, TSOs started publishing aggregate forecasts of
wind power generation in their control area. For example,
Belgium’s TSO, i.e., ELIA, publishes day-ahead and week-
ahead forecasts of wind power [4] in order to “provide the
basis for a harmonised, transparent environment and create
a level playing field between all market players, which will
potentially foster the development of the electricity market”
[5]. To this end, ENTSO-E Transparency Platform [6] provides
free, continuous access to Pan-European electricity market
data for all users, across six main categories: load, generation,
transmission, balancing, outages and congestion management.
However, Europe is not alone in taking decisive steps towards
public forecast-related information. The interest for public
aggregate forecasts is shared by more system operators in other
geographical areas, such as the Independent System Operator
of New England [7], Midcontinent Independent System Op-
erator [8] and Alberta Electric System Operator [9], which
provide aggregate day-ahead and/or week-ahead forecasts for
their control areas.
Despite the aforementioned political decisions and policy
regulations, according to the authors’ knowledge, there is
yet no technical paper in the power systems literature that
studies the impact of public aggregate forecasts on market
operation and market participants’ interests. Therefore, the
main contribution of this paper is to offer an insight into
how public forecasts and the level of their deviation can
potentially impact market operation as well as market par-
ticipants’ interests. The study is performed for a day-ahead
(DA) market setup with increased share of wind power. A
joint energy and reserve auction is considered, where strategic
conventional power producers may also include within their
offering portfolio wind power, which they offer at generation
cost based on a forecast. Given that producers may exercise
market power, it comes naturally to represent the market
by a non-cooperative game played among all producers. We
consider all producers as strategic players, given that an agent-
based approach would not allow us to incorporate the fact
that all producers have access to the same information and,
thus, they all have the capacity to exercise market power.
Therefore, a game-theoretic approach is followed where each
producer builds a mathematical program with equilibrium
constraints (MPEC) in order to optimally decide its offering
strategy. An iterative diagonalization approach [10]–[13] is
then incorporated to search for the equilibrium of the game,
which is found when no producer has incentive to change its
strategy unilaterally.
B. Literature Review and Contributions
The major drawback for the large-scale integration of wind
power in electricity markets is its intermittent nature. The cost
for backup flexibility reserves is considerably high in order to
guarantee reliability, while energy storage is still not mature
enough [14]. Despite the fact that wind power forecasting
will never be perfectly accurate, it has improved significantly
through intensive research spanning over the last two decades
[15]. Following the emergence of advanced methods for wind
power forecasting, the latter has been distinguished as a
dominant tool for market participation. Under this context,
an ever-increasing number of contributions is focusing on
suggesting tools for wind power trading in electricity markets
with significant share of wind power generation.
Initial studies adopted models where wind power producers
are non-strategic players, i.e., price-takers, and/or receiving
additional support when participating in a forward electric-
ity market [16]–[19]. However, as the cost of wind power
production is low and the competitiveness of wind power
increases, wind power producers are forced to participate in
the electricity markets under full competition and following the
same rules as conventional producers [3]. Under this context,
[20] considers that wind power producers strategically offer
their power in the balancing market. It is anticipated that
wind producer acts as a price-taker in DA market, due to
the large volume of traded energy. In addition, [20] inves-
tigates how the shape of the forecast distribution impacts the
offering strategy of producer. The problem of a price-maker
wind power producer in DA market, being a deviator in the
balancing market, is addressed in [21]. More specifically, the
problem is formulated as a stochastic optimization tool for
market participation, where uncertainty pertaining to wind
power production is represented through scenarios. The impact
of a price-maker wind power producer on electricity prices
as well as on the resulting imbalances is studied in [22] for
3a market without regulated tariffs. Furthermore, study [23]
additionally considered, through scenarios, the uncertainties
in demand, wind power generation and bidding strategies of
strategic conventional generators focusing on the problem of
strategic wind power trading.
Since strategies of rival traders in an electricity market are
a priori not known, a more realistic setup would suggest
the consideration of multiple strategic power producers com-
peting each other in an effort to increase their own profits.
Considering various market players that offer their generation
strategically acting as price-makers, the investigated market
can be seen as a non-cooperative game assuming complete
information knowledge. For example, in [24], the equilibria
reached by strategic producers in a pool-based electricity
market are investigated. The behavior of each power producer
is described by an MPEC, whose joint solution constitutes
an equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints (EPEC).
Moreover, in [25], strategic electricity producers react to both
prices and rival production changes, in both the spot and the
futures markets. The proposed model allows deriving analyti-
cal expressions that characterize such multi-market equilibria.
Motivated by the increasing levels of wind power penetration
in electricity markets, [26] investigates the equilibria in a
pool-based oligopolistic electricity market, including a DA
and several real-time (RT) markets, where wind power is also
considered within the generation portfolio of the strategic pro-
ducers. Then, the resulting EPEC is solved, in the search of the
equilibrium point. Following the same approach, [27] proposes
a stochastic model to find the equilibria that, compared to
[26], additionally considers the transmission constraints and
proposes a different approach for RT market clearing.
In view of the above, the central contribution of this paper is
to investigate the impact of public aggregate wind forecasts in
a competitive market environment. Even though availability
of public aggregate wind forecasts is expected to improve
market operation, strategic behaviour of market players could
merely jeopardize this vision. More precisely, the impact of
aggregate forecasts on the market results should be investi-
gated, given a market with strategic players. Therefore, we
study a market setup where producers, which include within
their portfolio both wind and conventional power units, offer
their conventional power strategically to the DA market, while
their wind power is offered at generation cost based on a
forecast. Producers determine their optimal offering strategy
considering individual forecasts for their own wind units as
well as the public aggregate forecast. Their decision-making
tool is formulated as a bilevel optimization model. Then,
the interaction of all participating producers is represented
as a non-cooperative game with complete information, whose
equilibrium is investigated through an iterative diagonalization
procedure. Energy and reserve prices as well as social welfare
are compared for under- and over-forecasting at the equilib-
rium points. Additionally, the results are analyzed from the
producers’ point of view by evaluating the impact of different
aggregate forecasts on their profits. Note that the contributions
of this study are not methodological, in the sense that we do
not present a new decision-making model or methodology for
finding the equilibria. On the contrary, we build a decision-
making tool based on available models in literature, and
investigate the new act of European electricity markets, i.e.,
publishing aggregate wind forecasts, and its impact on market
outcomes.
C. Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
proposes a bilevel optimization model for the strategic offering
of power producers and provides the corresponding mathe-
matical formulation. Additionally, it presents the methodology
followed for the equilibrium study among the various power
producers. Section III presents the results for a case-study
based on the IEEE reliability test system, as well as an
additional numerical study considering uncertainty of wind
generation and RT prices. Finally, Section IV concludes the
paper.
II. MODEL
This section is divided into four parts: Section II-A presents
the main features and assumptions of the model used in this
paper. Section II-B provides the mathematical formulation of
producers’ decision-making tool, while the iterative diagonal-
ization process followed to identify the equilibrium of the
game is described in Section II-C. Lastly, an additional step is
taken in Section II-D, where the actual DA market is cleared
based on the offers of producers at the equilibrium point.
A. Features and Assumptions
An imperfectly competitive electricity market is considered,
in which power producers include within their generation port-
folio both conventional and wind power generation. Producers
behave strategically with respect to price offers of conventional
generation [26], [28], but not regarding their wind generation,
which they offer deterministically based on a forecast. For the
sake of simplicity, transmission constraints are not enforced
[20], [22], [26]. In addition, the inter-temporal constraints, e.g.,
ramping limits of conventional units, are not enforced and thus
a single-hour auction is considered. This is consistent with
the relevant literature [20], [23], [24], [26]. In this study, we
only focus on DA market and evaluate its impact on market
outcomes in that stage. The RT stage, in which the actual
wind power is realized, is not considered in this study. Market
operator commits in DA a specific level of reserve capacity,
which manages the potential DA forecast errors in real time.
The required reserve capacity is exogenously sized based on
the total demand as well as on the installed wind capacity.
However, a complementary numerical study is additionally
presented in Section III-D, offering an insight on the same
problem considering uncertainty on wind power generation
and RT prices. Finally, we assume that the wind production
cost is zero and demand is deterministic and elastic with
respect to price.
B. Bilevel Model for Each Producer
In this subsection, the mathematical formulation of the
producers’ offering tool is presented. Each producer solves
bilevel problem (1) in order to optimize its offer, consid-
ering its privately owned wind power forecast as well as
4the available public aggregate wind power forecast. The
problem is formulated as a bilevel model for each producer
J , whose upper-level, i.e., (1a)-(1c), maximizes producer’s
profit and derives its strategic price offers and whose lower-
level problem, i.e., (1d)-(1o), clears the DA market through
maximizing social welfare. The upper-level objective function
(1a) is constrained by both upper-level constraints (1b)-(1c)
and lower-level problem (1d)-(1o). Note that dual variables
are indicated in each lower-level constraint after a colon.{
Maximize
αG
i,b
, ΞLL,P ∪ ΞLL,D
∑
i∈GJ
∑
b∈Bi
(λDA − CGi,b) pGi,b
+
∑
l∈WJ
(λDA pWl ) +
∑
i∈GJ
(µU rUi + µ
D rDi ) (1a)
subject to:
0 ≤ αGi,b ∀i ∈ GJ ,∀b (1b)
αGi,b−1 ≤ αGi,b ∀i ∈ GJ ,∀b ≥ 2 (1c)
where λDA, pWl , r
U
i , r
D
i , µ
U, µD and pGi,b ∀i ∈ GJ ,
∀l ∈ WJ , ∀b ∈ arg
{
maximize
ΞLL,P
∑
d∈D
λDd p
D
d −
∑
i∈G
∑
b∈Bi
αGi,b p
G
i,b (1d)
subject to:∑
i∈G
∑
b∈Bi
pGi,b +
∑
l∈W
pWl =
∑
d∈D
pDd : λ
DA (1e)
∑
i∈G
rUi ≥ γ
∑
d∈D
P
D
d + δ
∑
l∈W
W l : µ
U (1f)∑
i∈G
rDi ≥ γ
∑
d∈D
P
D
d + δ
∑
l∈W
W l : µ
D (1g)
0 ≤ rUi ≤ R
U
i : ρ
U
i
, ρUi ∀i (1h)
0 ≤ rDi ≤ R
D
i : ρ
D
i
, ρDi ∀i (1i)
0 ≤ pGi,b ≤ P
G
i,b : τ i,b, τ i,b ∀i, ∀b (1j)∑
b∈Bi
pGi,b + r
U
i ≤
∑
b∈Bi
P
G
i,b : φ
G
i ∀i (1k)
0 ≤
∑
b∈Bi
pGi,b − rDi : φGi ∀i (1l)
0 ≤ pDd ≤ P
D
d : ψd, ψd ∀d (1m)
0 ≤ pWl ≤ Fl : σl, σl ∀l ∈ WJ (1n)
0 ≤
∑
l/∈WJ
pWl ≤ FMO −
∑
l∈WJ
Fl : σ
MO, σMO
}
(1o)}
∀J
where ΞLL,P = {pWl , pGi,b, pDd , rUi , rDi } is the set of primal vari-
ables of lower-level problem (1d)-(1o). Furthermore, ΞLL,D =
{λDA, µU, µD, ρU
i
, ρUi , ρ
D
i
, ρDi , τ i,b, τ i,b, φ
G
i
, φ
G
i , ψd, ψd,
σl, σl, σ
MO, σMO} is the set of dual variables of the lower-
level problem. Finally, the primal variables of the upper-level
problem (1a)-(1c) are αGi,b as well as all members of variable
sets ΞLL,P and ΞLL,D.
The upper-level objective function, i.e., (1a), maximizes
profit of producer J , and includes:
• Producer’s profit due to conventional generation after de-
ducting the generation costs, i.e.,
∑
i∈GJ
∑
b∈Bi(λ
DA−
CGi,b) p
G
i,b.
• Producer’s profit due to wind generation, i.e.,∑
l∈WJ (λ
DA pWl ).
• Associated profits for providing upward and downward
reserve capacities, i.e.,
∑
i∈GJ (µ
U rUi + µ
D rDi ).
The upper-level constraints (1b)-(1c) impose the strategic
price offer for the conventional units, i.e., αGi,b, to be non-
negative and non-decreasing from the first offer block to
the last. The lower-level objective function (1d) maximizes
social welfare of the market based on producers’ offers and
demands’ bids, which is constrained by (1e)-(1o). Constraint
(1e) enforces the power balance in DA. Constraints (1f) and
(1g) impose the minimum reserve requirements of the market.
The level of minimum reserve requirements is introduced as
a portion of the total load level plus a portion of the level
of installed wind power capacity, using non-negative factors γ
and δ, respectively. Note that the dual variables of constraints
(1e), (1f) and (1g) indicate the prices for energy, upward
and downward committed reserves, respectively. Generation
and reserve capacities are imposed by constraints (1h)-(1l)
while the scheduled demand should be lower than or equal
to the total demand, imposed by (1m). Constraint (1n) sets
the scheduled wind for the investigated producer to be less
than or equal to its own private forecast. Finally, the aggregate
scheduled wind power of rival wind units should be lower than
or equal to the public aggregate forecast minus producer’s own
individual forecast, enforced by (1o).
Bilevel (1) is transformed into an MPEC, which is presented
in Appendix A. The corresponding MPEC is linearized and
then solved, as a mixed-integer linear programming problem.
The collection of all MPECs, one per producer, forms an
EPEC, whose solution identifies the equilibrium point. Unlike
[24]–[26] in which the lower-level problem of all producers
is common (equilibrium with shared constraints), the lower-
level problem of producers in this paper is different. This
prevents the use of EPEC solution techniques proposed in
[24]–[26]. Alternatively, we use an iterative diagonalization
approach to solve EPEC, in which each producer determines
sequentially its strategy considering the rivals’ strategies fixed.
The iterations continue until no producer changes its strategy
unilaterally or until the maximum number of iterations is
reached. Further description is available in the following
section.
C. Searching the Equilibrium Point Among Producers
We represent the game among all strategic producers by an
iterative diagonalization process, which is illustrated in Fig.
1. Producers make their offering decisions sequentially, while
at each step each producer considers the offers of rivals being
fixed. The game is, therefore, described by the following three
steps:
1) Iteration counter (c), maximum number of iterations
(cmax), convergence tolerance (ε) and price offering
5Solve MPEC for each producer : 
Solve each producer's MPEC 
sequentially. While solving MPEC for 
producer , offering strategies of all rival 
producers are kept fixed. 
Strategy vector is updated with the 
solutions of all MPECs  and is the input 
of the next iteration.
𝑥 𝑐 − 𝑥(𝑐 − 1) < 𝜀
for all producers?
Equilibrium point is found
𝑐 = 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥?
𝑐 = 𝑐 + 1.
END
No equilibrium is found
Initialize iteration counter,  𝑐.
Set maximum number of iterations, 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 
Set convergence tolerance, 𝜀.
Initialize price offering strategies, 𝑥 𝑐 , for 𝑐 = 1.
No
No
Yes
Yes
Fig. 1. The iterative diagonalization approach to identify the equilibrium
point.
strategies (x(c)) are initialized. For the first step of
the iterative process, producers’ price offering strategies,
i.e., vector of price offers, are initialized to be equal to
their marginal costs.
2) Through iteration c, each power producer solves the
corresponding MPEC in order to determine its optimal
offering strategy, keeping rivals’ offers fixed to their
value at iteration c−1. The vector of price offers is, thus,
updated by the solution of the corresponding MPEC for
all producers.
3) Finally, vector of price offers at iteration c is compared
to the one at iteration c-1. If their mathematical dis-
tance is greater than ε, then a new iteration starts. The
iterations stop either if this distance is smaller than the
value of tolerance, i.e., an equilibrium is found, or if
the maximum number of iterations has been reached,
indicating that no equilibrium is found.
D. Day-ahead Market Clearing
The answer to the central question of this work, i.e.,
investigating the impact of public aggregate wind forecast
on market results, requires taking an additional step where
DA market is actually cleared by the market operator based
on producers’ offers and demands’ bids. Note that each pro-
ducer subjectively anticipates DA market clearing, taking into
consideration the aggregate wind power forecast. However,
the market is actually cleared by the market operator based
solely on producers’ wind power offers, which are equal to
their private wind power forecast. Price offers for conventional
generation at the equilibrium point, derived by the models
presented in Sections II-B and II-C, are also considered for the
market clearing. Therefore, the formulation of the DA market
is given by (2) below:
TABLE I
TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF POWER GENERATION UNITS [MW]
Producer J with
generation port-
folio i and l
P
G
i,b1 P
G
i,b2 P
G
i,b3 P
G
i,b4 R
D
i R
U
i
Wind power
forecast by
producer (Fl)
j1 60.8 91.2 91.2 60.8 80 80 200
j2 75 75 90 60 75 75 350
j3 206.85 147.75 118.2 118.2 120 120 450
j4 12 18 18 12 0 0 400
j5 217 155 124 124 180 180 -
j6 200 200 240 160 80 80 -
j7 300 0 0 0 0 0 -
j8 140 87.5 52.5 70 80 80 -
Maximize
pG
i,b
,pW
l
,pD
d
,rU
i
,rD
i
∑
d∈D
λDd p
D
d −
∑
i∈G
∑
b∈Bi
αGi,b p
G
i,b (2a)
subject to:
(1e)− (1m) (2b)
0 ≤ pWl ≤ Fl ∀l. (2c)
Note that the results obtained from lower-level problem in
model (1) and those obtained from model (2) are not neces-
sarily the same, though their optimization structure is similar.
In the lower-level problem of model (1) corresponding to a
particular producer, the market is cleared from the producer’s
perspective based on the available data for that producer, i.e.,
forecast for its own wind power units and public aggregate
wind forecast. However, model (2) actually clears the market
from market operator’s point of view considering the offer
prices received from (1) and the private wind forecasts of
producers. Therefore, constraints (2b) are the same with lower-
level problem (1e)-(1m) of each producer but lower-level
constraints (1n) and (1o) are now replaced by (2c) for all
producers. In addition αGi,b,∀i,∀b are now parameters, derived
from the equilibrium model presented in Section II-C.
III. CASE STUDY
A. Data
A single-hour case-study based on the IEEE one-area relia-
bility test system [29] is considered. For the sake of simplicity,
conventional units are grouped by type. Each conventional
unit offers at a quantity identical to its installed capacity,
given in Table I, and at a strategic price that can differ from
its marginal costs, which are presented in Table II. Among
eight producers competing in this case study, four of them,
namely producers j1, j2, j3 and j4, own wind power units
in addition to their conventional generation capacity. Each
of those producers forecasts its own wind power generation
deterministically. The forecasted values are listed in the last
column of Table I. Note that these individual forecasts are
private data and are not shared with the rivals. The demand
levels and the corresponding bids are presented in Table III
while the factors defining the minimum reserve requirements
are arbitrarily chosen as γ = 0.05 and δ = 0.1. Finally, the
computational issues are discussed in Appendix C.
B. Reference Case: Public Aggregate Wind Forecast Equals
the Sum of Private Individual Forecasts
In real-world markets, producers with wind power within
their generation portfolio usually make their offers to the
6TABLE II
MARGINAL COSTS OF CONVENTIONAL UNITS [$/MWh]
CGi,b1 C
G
i,b2 C
G
i,b3 C
G
i,b4
j1 11.46 11.96 21.67 22.72
j2 18.60 20.03 21.67 22.72
j3 19.20 20.32 21.22 22.13
j4 23.41 23.78 26.84 30.4
j5 9.92 10.25 10.68 11.26
j6 5.31 5.38 5.53 5.66
j7 2.00 - - -
j8 10.08 10.66 11.09 11.72
TABLE III
DEMAND CHARACTERISTICS
Demand level [MW] Demand bid [$/MWh]
d1 550 65
d2 300 60
d3 500 55
d4 300 55
d5 200 52
d6 450 52
d7 500 50
d8 200 50
d9 300 50
d10 200 50
Total 3500 -
market based on a deterministic forecast, which is privately
generated and accessible. Undoubtedly, the sum of these
individual forecasts differs from the aggregate forecast of the
market operator. A special case, according to which the sum of
private individual wind forecasts equals the public aggregate
one, is used throughout this study as a reference. In this case,
the public aggregate wind forecast is 1400 MW, which is the
sum of individual wind forecasts reported in the last column
of Table I.
For the reference case, the strategic price offers of producers
are derived and presented in Table IV. Producers j1, j2, j5, j6
and j8 offer their cheap generation blocks at zero price in
order to get scheduled. The energy price is $18.601/MWh as
presented in Table V. However, the corresponding capacity
prices for committed downward and upward reserve are both
zero. This is explained by the last two columns of Table
VI, where it is observed that producers j1, j2 and j3, j8
have still additional available downward and upward reserve
capacity, respectively. Therefore, constraints (1f) and (1g),
which enforce the minimum reserve requirements of the mar-
ket, are not binding and the corresponding dual variables are
zero. Table VI additionally presents producers’ total profits for
the reference case, as well as the scheduled power for each
generation block of each producer. Note that each wind farm
is scheduled in DA market at a quantity equal to its owner’s
wind power forecast.
C. Public Aggregate Wind Forecast Differs from the Sum of
Private Individual Forecasts
In this section we investigate the impact of deviations
between public aggregate wind forecast and the sum of private
ones, on market results and on producers’ profits. For this
purpose we search the equilibrium under different values
of aggregate forecast, which may not be equal to the one
corresponding to the reference case. The problem is solved
for aggregate forecast that takes values in a wide range
TABLE IV
STRATEGIC PRICE OFFERS AT THE EQUILIBRIUM POINT FOR REFERENCE
CASE [$/MWh]
αGi,b1 α
G
i,b2 α
G
i,b3 α
G
i,b4
j1 0 18.600 18.601 18.602
j2 0 18.601 18.602 18.603
j3 18.601 18.602 18.603 18.604
j4 18.601 18.602 18.603 18.604
j5 0 0.001 0.002 18.600
j6 0 0.001 0.002 18.601
j7 18.600 - - -
j8 0 0.001 0.002 18.601
TABLE V
ENERGY AND RESERVE PRICES FOR REFERENCE CASE
Price [$/MWh]
µU 0
µD 0
λDA 18.601
around the reference case, which is used for comparison.
More specifically, aggregate forecast is considered to take
different values between 900 MW and 1900 MW in 10-MW
steps. Recall that the sum of private forecasts is 1400 MW
(reference case). Note that for values of aggregate forecast that
no equilibrium is found, there are no results to be presented.
Fig. 2 shows energy and reserve prices at the equilibrium
point for different aggregate wind forecast values. It is ob-
served that energy price is zero for low values of aggregate
forecast, i.e., below 1030 MW. Then, following some small
fluctuations, it stabilizes at $18.601/MWh. Zero energy price
for small values of aggregate wind forecast is explained by
producers’ price offers. More particularly, when the aggregate
wind forecast is low, the producers expect low wind power
penetration in the market based on their decision-making
model (1). The producers do not have information on rivals’
wind offers and therefore anticipate market outcomes based on
the available aggregate wind forecast. Thus, from producers’
perspective, the expected low wind power penetration (low
aggregate forecast) indicates potentially high market-clearing
price. This motivates some producers to offer at zero price in
order to get scheduled. However, this has the opposite result in
terms of actual market outcomes. Producers’ zero price offers
along with the total wind power (which is higher than produc-
ers anticipated) lead to zero market-clearing price. Moreover,
prices for committed downward reserve are always zero in this
study, which is explained by the fact that there is sufficient
capacity for downward reserve, without incurring extra cost.
In other words, the corresponding reserve requirement never
changes the power schedule of generators. However, prices for
committed upward reserve can take non-zero values, especially
for values of aggregate forecast below and around 1400 MW.
From Fig. 3 it is observed that for small values of aggregate
forecast, profits of all producers are either zero or negative.
This result is again explained by the producers’ expectations
for high energy prices, which inevitably leads to the opposite
results, i.e., zero prices, with the consequent impact on pro-
ducers’ profits. It should be noted that the producers’ offers
are derived from model (1) and are based on their available
information. Accordingly, producers do not anticipate their
7TABLE VI
SCHEDULES AND PRODUCERS’ PROFITS AT THE EQUILIBRIUM POINT FOR
THE REFERENCE CASE
Profit [$] Scheduled power per gen-eration block [MW]
Committed capac-
ity for upward re-
serve [MW]
Committed capac-
ity for downward
reserve [MW]
j1 4760 60.8; 91.2; 0; 0 80 0
j2 6510 75.0; 0; 0; 0 75 35
j3 8370 0; 0; 0; 0 70 0
j4 7382 12.0; 0; 0; 0 0 0
j5 5070 217.0; 155.0; 124.0; 124.0 0 180
j6 8711 200.0; 200.0; 240.0; 21.0 80 80
j7 4980 300.0; 0; 0; 0 0 0
j8 2282 140.0; 87.5; 52.5; 0 70 80
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Fig. 2. Energy and reserve prices for different aggregate forecast values
profits to be negative. For example, Fig. 4 shows that, apart
from producer j7 (red bars) who is not scheduled for aggregate
forecasts below 1030 MW, all other producers are scheduled
in the DA market. As already discussed, in the case of small
aggregate forecasts, producers mostly offer their generation at
zero price in order to get scheduled, expecting that the energy
price will actually be high. However, energy price is eventually
zero, leading to negative profits for producers. Obviously, this
is an unfavorable result for the producers, which happened
due to their decision-making process that depends on public
aggregate forecasts. This result can be better understood by
comparing models (1) and (2) of Sections II.B and II.D,
respectively. Producers anticipate market outcomes based on
model (1) that considers the public aggregate forecast, i.e.,
constraint (1o), while the actual market is cleared based on
wind offers, which are fixed and equal to the individual wind
forecasts of producers, i.e., constraint (2c).
In addition, social welfare is also affected by the level of
aggregate forecast. In Fig. 5, we present the social welfare
calculated as the value obtained for objective function (2a).
Social welfare is not directly affected by public aggregate
forecast - which has a direct impact on the producers decision-
making model (1). In turn, producers’ strategic decisions, i.e.,
price offers of conventional generation, have a direct impact on
the market-clearing results and, thus, on social welfare. Even
though producers always offer their wind power generation
based solely on their private wind forecast, their price offers
for conventional generation are highly affected by the level of
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Fig. 4. Day-ahead schedules of conventional generators for different aggregate
forecast values
public aggregate forecast, with consequent impact on market-
clearing outcomes and social welfare. In line with the previous
description, low values of aggregate forecast lead to low
price offers from producers and, therefore, cheaper energy
is scheduled in the market. Consequently, social welfare is
increased for low aggregate wind forecast. Likewise, higher
values of aggregate forecast lead to lower social welfare,
caused by comparatively high price offers.
For further clarity, the supply-demand curves for some cases
of specific interest are presented in Fig. 6. As described earlier,
the wind power offers are always equal to the producers’
individual forecasts at zero price. However, price offers for
conventional generators are different, derived from model (1),
which depends on the level of aggregate wind forecast. Hence,
one can see that the price offers at FMO=1030 MW lead
to zero energy price while in cases of FMO=1400 MW and
FMO=1500 MW energy price is $18.601/MWh. The case of
FMO=1200 MW is of specific interest given that the upward
reserve constraint is active. Therefore, even though the supply-
demand curve sets the energy price at $11.26/MWh (see point
in circle in Fig. 6), the actual energy price derived from model
(2) is $19.20/MWh, due to the positive price for the upward
reserve.
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D. Uncertainty of Wind Forecasts and Real-Time Prices
In the previous sections we have focused on a DA market
setup only. However, it is of further interest to confirm the
validity of the aforementioned results based on a case-study
accommodating a certain degree of uncertainty stemming from
the RT market stage. Indeed, considering the uncertainty of
wind power generation along with the anticipation of the RT
market prices can enable the derivation of advanced strategies
for wind power producers, avoiding additional costs due to
forecast errors in the RT stage. Using as a basis the presented
case-study, we search the equilibrium of the market under a
number of scenarios for the RT wind power generation as well
as the RT prices, following the approach of [21]. According
to the above, model (1) is transformed into the new problem
(4), the formulation of which is presented in Appendix B.
The input data for this numerical case-study are presented in
Tables VII and VIII, defining three scenarios for each source
of uncertainty. Note that the deterministic forecast used in the
previous sections, is equal to the expected values of the three
wind scenarios. Furthermore, similarly to [21], we assume that
wind power producers are price-takers in the RT market and,
thus, they do not affect RT prices.
Following the same presentation as before, we present the
two most interesting figures, i.e, social welfare and producers’
profits for various levels of aggregate forecasts. In Fig. 7, a
similar trend with the analysis of Section III-C is observed.
Social welfare is comparatively lower for greater values of
TABLE VII
SCENARIOS FOR WIND POWER GENERATION (PW,P
l,ω
) [MW]
ω1 ω2 ω3
piω 0.2 0.3 0.5
j1 160 250 186
j2 260 320 404
j3 400 430 482
j4 320 380 444
j5 - - -
j6 - - -
j7 - - -
j8 - - -
TABLE VIII
SCENARIOS FOR REAL-TIME PRICES [$/MWh]
s1 s2 s3
piλs
1
3
1
3
1
3
λRTs 10 20 30
aggregate forecasts. However, the possibility of having high
RT prices may weaken the aforementioned decreasing profile
of social welfare. Finally, Fig. 8 is similar to Fig. 3 of the DA-
only study, where it is observed that for very small values of
aggregate forecasts producers may earn zero or even negative
profits. The interpretation of this outcome is already presented
in detail in Section III-C.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
An increasing interest towards transparency and competi-
tiveness in energy markets has led to decisions and directives
for the publication of various market-related information. To
this end, system operators invest in generating and publish-
ing qualitative market data, including aggregate wind power
forecast, envisioning an improved and transparent market
operation. In the presence of a public aggregate wind forecast,
participating producers may consider this information in their
decision-making tool. This paper uses a complementarity
model that provides producers with the strategic price offers
for their conventional generation, while wind power is offered
at zero price based on an individual forecast. The main scope
of the study is, by using the aforementioned model, to inves-
tigate how the availability of public aggregate forecasts can
affect electricity market outcomes. To this end, we considered
multiple strategic producers and described the market as a non-
cooperative game, whose equilibrium is approached through
an iterative diagonalization technique.
The results of this equilibrium study indicate that market-
clearing prices (energy and reserve) and social welfare of the
market could be significantly affected by the public aggregate
wind forecast. More precisely, the under-forecast of aggregate
wind power leads to comparatively low or even zero energy
prices. Producers expect high prices due to decreased wind
power penetration and thus make low price offers for a
portion of their generation portfolio in order to get scheduled.
Low price offers inevitably impact social welfare, which
increases accordingly. The opposite effect is observed for
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Fig. 8. Producers’ profits for different aggregate forecast values considering
uncertainty in wind power generation and real-time prices
aggregate forecasts of greater values than the reference, i.e.,
social welfare decreases. As anticipated, energy prices affect
producers’ profits as well. For small values of aggregate
forecast, producers’ profits are very low and in some cases
even negative. Producers offer their power in lower prices,
than the corresponding generation cost, mislead by erroneous
aggregate forecasts causing them negative instead of positive
profits.
Under such a setup, it is evident that the level of public
aggregate forecast can indeed misguide producers’ strategic
behaviour. In turn, this has a major impact on social wel-
fare, which is considerably decreased or increased, for over-
or under-forecasts. In this work, wind power was offered
deterministically to the market based on a forecast. It is
of our future interest to investigate how aggregate forecasts
would impact the results under a stochastic market setup,
as in [30] for example. Lastly, the outcomes of this study
can contribute towards the discussion on the importance of
sharing and publishing wind power forecasts on the bene-
fit of market operation, initially discussed in [31]. Favored
by ambitious plans for high quality market-related data, it
is strongly believed that understanding the role of forecast
information and their status, being public or private, can have
a crucial impact on electricity market functioning. To this
end, it is highly relevant to account for incentive-compatible
mechanisms, such as mechanism design [32] or consensus-
based distributed market clearing [33], which can elicit truthful
decisions from market’s parties, increasing the transparency of
the electricity market.
APPENDIX
A. MPEC Formulation
Lower-level problem (1d)-(1o) is continuous, linear and,
therefore, convex. This allows bilevel problem (1) to be
recast as a single-level MPEC through replacing the lower-
level problem by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality
conditions, as presented below:{
Maximize
αG
i,b
, ΞLL,P ∪ ΞLL,D
(1a) (3a)
subject to:
(1b), (1c) and (1e) (3b)
αGi,b − λDA + φ
G
i − φGi + τ i,b − τ i,b = 0 ∀i, ∀b (3c)
− λDd + λDA + ψd − ψd = 0 ∀d (3d)
− λDA + σl − σl = 0 ∀l ∈ WJ (3e)
− λDA + σMO − σMO = 0 (3f)
− µU + ρUi − ρUi + φ
G
i = 0 ∀i (3g)
− µD + ρDi − ρDi + φ
G
i
= 0 ∀i (3h)
0 ≤
(∑
i∈G
rUi − γ
∑
d∈D
P
D
d − δ
∑
l∈W
W l
)
⊥ µU ≥ 0
(3i)
0 ≤
(∑
i∈G
rDi − γ
∑
d∈D
P
D
d − δ
∑
l∈W
W l
)
⊥ µD ≥ 0
(3j)
0 ≤ rUi ⊥ ρUi ≥ 0 ∀i (3k)
0 ≤ (RUi − rUi ) ⊥ ρUi ≥ 0 ∀i (3l)
0 ≤ rDi ⊥ ρDi ≥ 0 ∀i (3m)
0 ≤ (RDi − rDi ) ⊥ ρDi ≥ 0 ∀i (3n)
0 ≤ pGi,b ⊥ τ i,b ≥ 0 ∀i, ∀b (3o)
0 ≤ (PGi,b − pGi,b) ⊥ τGi,b ≥ 0 ∀i, ∀b (3p)
0 ≤ (
∑
b∈Bi
pGi,b − rDi ) ⊥ φGi ≥ 0 ∀i (3q)
0 ≤ (
∑
b∈Bi
P
G
i,b −
∑
b∈Bi
pGi,b − rUi ) ⊥ φ
G
i ≥ 0 ∀i (3r)
0 ≤ pDd ⊥ ψd ≥ 0 ∀d (3s)
0 ≤ (PDd − pDd ) ⊥ ψd ≥ 0 ∀d (3t)
0 ≤ pWl ⊥ σl ≥ 0 ∀l ∈WJ (3u)
0 ≤ (Fl − pWl ) ⊥ σl ≥ 0 ∀l ∈WJ (3v)
0 ≤
∑
l/∈WJ
pWl ⊥ σMO ≥ 0 (3w)
0 ≤
(
FMO −
∑
l/∈WJ
pWl −
∑
l∈WJ
Fl
)
⊥ σMO ≥ 0
(3x)}
∀J .
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MPECs (3), one per producer, are non-linear due to the
following two sources of non-linearities:
• The bi-linear terms λDApGi,b, λ
DApWl , µ
UrUi and µ
DrDi
included in the objective function (3a).
• Complementarity conditions (3i)-(3x).
The bi-linear terms inside the objective function are lin-
earized based on an approach without approximation, deploy-
ing the strong duality theorem and mathematical expressions
(3c)-(3x), as in [24]. Finally, complementarity conditions are
linearized based on an SOS1-based approach [34], [35] but at
the cost of introducing a set of auxiliary SOS1 variables.
B. Problem Formulation Considering Real-Time Stage Sce-
narios
Considering scenarios for the actual wind power generation
and for the RT prices, the formulation of model (1) is
transformed into (4) below:{
Maximize
αG
i,b
, pW,RT
l,ω
, ΞLL,P ∪ ΞLL,D∑
i∈GJ
∑
b∈Bi
(λDA − CGi,b) pGi,b
+
∑
l∈WJ
(λDA pWl ) +
∑
i∈GJ
(µU rUi + µ
D rDi )
−
∑
ω∈Ω
piω
∑
s∈S
piλs
[ ∑
l∈WJ
λRTs p
W,RT
l,ω
]
(4a)
subject to:
(1b)− (1c) (4b)
PW,Pl,ω + p
W,RT
l,ω = p
W
l ∀l ∈ WJ ,∀ω (4c)
where λDA, pWl and p
G
i,b ∀i ∈ GJ ,
∀l ∈ WJ , ∀b ∈ arg
{
maximize
ΞLL,P
∑
d∈D
λDd p
D
d −
∑
i∈G
∑
b∈Bi
αGi,b p
G
i,b (4d)
subject to:
(1e)− (1o) } (4e)}
∀J
where constraint (4c) ensures that the power imbalance due to
the difference between the DA scheduled wind power and the
actual generated one under scenario ω, is adjusted in RT by
the traded RT wind power. A positive value of pW,RTl,ω indicates
that wind power production is lower than the scheduled one
in DA market, incurring an additional cost for the producer.
C. Computational Issues
For the simulations of this paper we have used CPLEX
under GAMS on a Windows 8.1, 64-bit operating system
with 2 cores processor running at 2.4 GHz and 12 GB of
RAM. The total computational time for the whole case-study
was 720 s. Furthermore, for the cases where equilibrium was
found (82 out of 101) it took less than 5 iterations to find
the equilibrium. The computational time depends highly on
whether an equilibrium is found or if the process terminates
after maximum number of iterations, the latter requiring more
time. The convergence tolerance was set at  = 0.3 and the
maximum number of iterations cmax = 10. In this paper,
we use an iterative diagonalization approach which is simple
but at the risk of not converging in the predefined number of
iterations. One sort of alternatives is to augment the current di-
agonalization technique by increasing the number of iterations
and/or providing different starting points. Another alternative
is to use non-iterative equilibrium solution techniques (e.g., in
[26]), but at the cost of increased complexity. Lastly, the setup
that was chosen for this study allows us to get an insight into
the role of public aggregate forecasts in electricity markets
without constructing a complicated tool. Scaling the problem
up to a n-player setup would lead to an agent-based analysis
with similar qualitative results but increased computational
complexity.
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